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The debt of the Hôtel-Dieu de Paris from 1660 to 1690: 
a testbed for sovereign default 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. It is generally accepted that there was no proper evaluation of life 
annuities in the seventeenth century, thus the bankruptcy of the Paris Hôtel-Dieu 
1689 is commonly attributed to this mispricing. New sources show that the prices of 
annuities from 1668 on are compatible with Deparcieux’s mortality table discounted 
at the legal rate of interest. The bankruptcy resulted from incorrect provisioning of 
life annuities liabilities rather than mispricing.  That story would have been 
anecdotal if the French king had not decided to borrow using contingent annuities 
around the same time: the Crown’s plan can be shown to be unsustainable.  
 
Keywords: life annuities, financial revolution, early modern Europe, hospitality. 
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North and Weingast (1989) have shown that England won the wars against France 
not just on the battlefield: the superiority of British institutions enabled larger and 
steadier borrowing to fund a long-term conflict, which ended only in 1815 when 
Bonaparte was ultimately defeated. Recent studies into this topic have shown that 
the French tried to compensate the low return on taxation by superior design of their 
borrowing schemes (Beguin (2012) ch. 6 and 7), especially life-contingent schemes 
such as tontines (Gallais-Hamonno and Berthon (2008)). Such claims, frequent 
among the projectors of the time, might now appear delusory, as it is well known 
that during the seventeenth century life contingent annuities were priced correctly 
neither in France nor in Britain (Rothschild 2003). Clark (1999) harshly commented: 
“The life insurance businesses of the early eighteenth century have been portrayed 
most generously as mistaken attempts to take the practice of insurance into 
uncharted demographic territory without the guidance of mortality statistics or 
actuarial calculation. Most usually they have simply been dismissed as gambling 
schemes heedless of mortality data and the long-term economics of their operations 
or, even worse, been condemned as outright fraud.” Although there are not much 
examples of such business in France, an edict of the king Louis XIV (1690) forbade 
the “Hôpital général and others to take annuities”. This text strongly attacked the 
method of “taking money without payback option, in order to constitute [life] 
annuities at rate higher than usual”, since it is “from day to day so detrimental as to 
put [the hospitals] out of order if it were continued for a while.” To make a long 
story short, the edict argues that the issuance of life annuities had led the Hôtel-
Dieu to bankruptcy. Most historians since that time took it for granted that the Sun 
King was right and while the Hôtel-Dieu itself has been under close review by 
Fosseyeux (1912), Depauw (1999) and McHugh (2007), there is no detailed account of 
the financial process described in the aforementioned edict. 
 
The case provided by the Paris Hospitals might appear anecdotal in comparison 
with the far-reaching perspective of North and Weingast. There is nevertheless 
something worth looking into the details: the French monarchy had begun issuing 
life-contingent annuities on the very same year when the Hôtel-Dieu experienced 
financial distress. One must then ask at least whether the borrowing scheme of the 
French Crown can be compared to the Hôtel-Dieu experience, in order to assess the 
sustainability of the former from the natural experiment of the latter. There was no 
data to perform such comparison so far, but we collected evidence from the notarial 
deeds and deliberations of the board of the hospital to document its pricing policy 
and compare it to the series of sovereign borrowing rates contained in Béguin 
(2012). The data undoubtedly show that the life annuities were correctly (i. e. more 
than actuarially) priced and that a crowding out effect occurred between the 
sovereign perpetuities and the Hôtel-Dieu annuities. Hence the comparison was 
unavoidable, and a conclusion could be drawn on the ex ante sustainability of the 
debt issued from 1689 by the Crown. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: after a presentation of the context and 
the data (1.), we will prove that the selling price of the Hôtel-Dieu life annuities was 
more than their actuarial value (2.). We will then try to discover the causes of the 
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1689 bankruptcy (3.) and compare the Hôtel-Dieu life annuities with other financial 
assets available to the French households in the period (4.) to assess the 
sustainability of the king’s borrowing strategy. 
* 
1. The Hôtel-Dieu de Paris: medieval hospital or early financial institution? 
After being founded in 651 by Landry, bishop of Paris, the Hôtel-Dieu was given 
written constitutions in 1168 (Imbert 1996). As a result, the cathedral chapter of the 
diocese of Paris administered every aspect of the hospital, which relied on real 
estate donations to fund three main missions: heal the sick, house the old, relieve 
the poor. When, at the end of the fifteenth century, the cathedral canons were 
stuck into a decade-lasting financial crisis, they asked both the City and the 
Parlement of Paris for help (Imbert 1993). The laymen took over the administrative 
management of the hospital and the religious lost their grip on the institution: in 
the new statutes of 1505, the religious retained authority solely on religious matters, 
while the board of the hospital featured only laymen, with the premier president of 
the Parlement of Paris acting as chairman. During the next century, the history of 
the institution matched the narrative of how hospital management became an 
important matter for the (catholic) urban elites during the Counter-Reformation 
(1.1.). In this context, life annuities do not appear as a common financing means for 
charitable institutions, but these sales were framed as charity (1.2.), life annuities 
have traditionally been used to fund cities in time of distress (1.3.). In contrast with 
other early implementations of life annuities, the Hôtel-Dieu provides valuable data 
(1.4.). 
1.1. Seventeenth-century charity 
Historical research on the immediate impact of the catholic Counter-Reformation 
in France has shown how religious congregations2 as well as companies of secular 
priests3 developed a new spirituality, attracting vocations (in a pre-malthusian 
context where matrimonial strategies of the elites aimed at concentrating wealth, 
Béguin 2015) and preaching active charity. The founding of charitable institutions is 
a conspicuous effect of this dynamics, which has been studied from the point of 
view of hospitals (Barry-Jones 1991, Brockliss-Jones 1997). What Cavallo writes 
about Torino might be true about Paris as well: 
“Evidently, the institutionalisation [i. e. placing them in institutions] of 
the poor – by creating an arena in which city elites could put their 
prestige on display through their charitable acts – stimulated their 
generosity considerably. In fact, the end of the century is marked by a 
large increase both in the number of legacies and in their average 
size.” (Cavallo 1995 p. 100) 
                                            
2 Such as Feuillantines, Filles de la Charité, Missionnaires Lazaristes, etc. 
3 Such as Berulle’s Oratoire de Jésus or Ollier’s Société de Saint-Sulpice. 
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The only difference between Paris and Torino seems to be in the timing: Cavallo’s 
study begins during the Council of Trent, while the French became impassioned 
for large-scale charity more than 50 years later, with the foundation of the Hôpital 
des Incurables (1630) and of the Hôpital Général (1655). In that time, the Hôtel-Dieu 
already enjoyed a thousand year history, it joined the reformation led in France by 
Monsieur Vincent (de Paul). McHugh’s (2007) recent book has a full chapter on “The 
Reform of the Paris Hôtel-Dieu”, showing the commitment of the elite manage and 
fund this hospital from the 1650’s on. By “elite”, we mean that the governors were 
chosen among the top judges and lawyers with the supreme courts as well as 
échevins and bourgeois of the municipality. After the 1690 bankruptcy, the 
constitutions were further changed, and the traditional patronage of the Premier 
President was supplemented by highest officials such as the Premier President of the 
Cour des Aides and the Lieutenant de Police. The donors were no less famous than the 
administrators, with both the most ancient nobility and the new wealthy robins4.  
Many figures were both administrators and donators, such as for instance Jean 
Bachelier and François Choart. A squire, the former is well into the king’s 
businesses as a conseiller du roi and director with the compagnie des Indes Orientales; 
his wills offered 50,000 livres to the hospital. The latter served as maître ordinaire en 
la chambre des comptes and eventually donated 80,000 livres. Both took part in the 
two weekly meetings of the board, examining up to forty questions per session. 
While the highest-ranking presidents did not attend more than twice a year, the 8 
other members of the board really took care of the poor diseased: they did not just 
watch the expenses, they visited every working part of the hospital down to the 
kitchen and looked after the constitutions. Perhaps the most spectacular result of 
their administration was the medicalization of the Hôtel-Dieu: between 1630 and 
1660, the only physician was supplemented with six more colleagues; moreover in 
1636 these doctors were given the right to excuse patients from fasting during Lent.  
Shifting power from the clerics to physicians is a strong symbol: this is in sharp 
contrast with the received view that, before the French Revolution, the religious 
hospitals were not institutions thought to cure but to separate the poor. The reform 
of the Hôtel-Dieu can be thought of as a rationalization in the sense proposed by 
Max Weber in his Protestant Ethic: financial computation is a common practice for 
the administrators. Although they were devout catholic, likely to be linked with the 
Compagnie du Saint-Sacrement, they had a modernizing view: the “nobility of the 
robe” (judges and lawyers) used hospital management as a way to display its 
expertise in social affairs above the traditional “nobility of the sword”. The new 
elite had a distinctive edge in financial management, which proved useful in a time 
of troubles. During the winter of 1662, for instance, which proved so harsh that 
                                            
4 While the duchess de Miramion donated her hotel, which still hosts the assistance publique 
museum, we found records of donations of the duke de La Rochefoucauld, duke d’Estrées and 
duchess of Nemours during the 1680’s alone. Among the junior fellows, two sisters of Colbert 
during the 1660’s: Margueritte, whose husband Vincent Hotman donated his whole wealth, and 
Antoinette bought annuities for 60,000 livres. Some Colbert hirelings, such as Jacques Chertemps 
de Seuil “donated” more than 50,000 livres in 1673 alone.  
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.57
Debt of the Paris Hôtel-Dieu 1660-1690 
 6 
hundreds of poor came to the city to beg for bread, the Hôtel-Dieu provided more 
than two thousands of them with it. As a consequence, the deficit for years 1662 
and 1663 overall was running above 225,000 livres, almost two thirds of a 360,000 
livres income. Most of this income came from rent on land donated since the 
Middle Ages, and was thus inelastic.  
The administrators had then to find money in order to avoid bankruptcy. For 
McHugh (2007) p. 79 “the evidence for how the Hôtel-Dieu overcame its deficit is 
scanty, but it seems that the appeal for more charity, coupled with the temporary 
cessation of payment to those holding rentes (…) was enough.” We know by 
indirect evidence, that the institution was considered a landmark in financial 
management, as other religious communities were following its investment advices5. 
But the administrators kept their best trick for the Hôtel-Dieu alone6: life annuities. 
While only one such contract was concluded in 1659 and 20 in 1661, the figure was 
50 in 1662 and 117 in 1665 (see figure 1 below). During this latter year, the total 
proceeds of annuities sales was more than 600,000 livres, almost twice the yearly 
budget of the entire year 1663! At the same moment, while it might appear that the 
old hospital was evolving into a financial institution, we would like to insist, in full 
agreement with McHugh, that the sale of life annuities was framed as charity.  
Figure 1 — life annuities valuations and transactions 
 
 
1.2. Framing issues 
It should be made clear that our framing of, say, “the sale of life annuities” would 
have been irrelevant at the time of the story. Buyers were called “donators” and 
they thought they were donating to the Hôtel-Dieu: since the Middle Ages, people 
                                            
5 During the 1670’s we found evidence of three convents buying assets through the Hôtel-Dieu 
notary, Chuppin, himself a member of the board: namely, the Maurists from Saint-Père-en-Vallée, 
the Missions étrangères, and the nuns at the Madeleine; see MC XXXIII, 124 and 129. 
6 The brothers of charity attempted to share the privilege of life annuities issuance in 1665, but the 
administrators of the Hôtel-Dieu circumvented the project; see proceedings, 3rd of June 1667.   
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have donated real estate to the hospital, while keeping the usufruct during their 
lives. The same could be done on a basis which seems to us “purely financial”: 
people gave a perpetuity security, such as rentes sur l’Hôtel de Ville de Paris which 
were issued to fund the Crown (Béguin 2012) and kept the income while they were 
alive. To the contemporaries, though, the framing was not “purely financial” as the 
perpetuities enjoyed the same legal status as realty (hence the need for a notary to 
process the sale as if it were land). People literally buying an annuity were in fact 
buying a perpetuity considered as a realty, which they donated to the Hôtel-Dieu 
while keeping usufruct for life. While this legal and psychological construction 
seems pretty complex, the administrators were very circumspect to prevent abuse.  
The “abuse” which could arise from life annuity buying was not connected with 
adverse selection in the modern sense, but with alienation of family wealth. Any 
individual was only made a steward of the lineage’s wealth, he could not dispose of 
it (see infra repayment to the family, not the individual). Hence, on the 19th of June 
1665, the board does not accept a man’s offer “because he looks for an annuity for 
himself while his wife could survive him and chiefly because he has children…” 
The very same 1665 year, the administrator discovered that “the wife of Louet de 
Chatillon” donated three times to the Hôtel-Dieu “while she has children from a 
first marriage”; they decided to inquire before refunding the money “to the family”. 
Any contract after 1665 would include a clause “if the donator were to marry and 
were children to advent, the administrators would be free to refund the family 
[emphasis added] with 1/30 interest from today, any further arrear being 
subtracted7”. It seems that the Hôtel-Dieu never gave any refund: this clause might 
have be added to comply with the King’s policy, as expressed in an edict of 16618. 
So far, even during the Fronde, when land rents were not paid on time, sometimes 
not at all, and state securities, which should have provided almost 50,000 livres a 
year9, also suffered default, the Hôtel-Dieu managed to gather enough donations to 
overcome the troubles. Then came the year 1662 : the administrators could have 
played down their role; they decided instead to feed the poor. To fund this 
ambitious social program, they did what Northern European cities had done before 
in order to attract funding in times of distress. 
                                            
7 Annuity for Jeanne-Françoise Héron, April the 1st, 1690, AN MC xxxiii, 140. Many other examples, 
passim in MC xxxiii. 
8 Before the 1690 Edict, a previous text in 1661 castigated “those who had been stripped of all 
feeling of affection for their parents and families, considering only their own satisfaction, and 
seeking only the ease and convenience of life, which they believe to be guaranteed enjoyment of 
whatever their property that could produce. Those have taken the trouble to increase their income 
at the expense of loss and alienation of their funds and principal. In this thought, some have sold 
the property of their houses, land and inheritance, and converted the value of these in hard cash: 
they found people willing to receive and accept as irrevocable donations these monies in exchange 
for an annuity during their lives only, but of greater amount than permited by the law [emphasis 
added]” See Béguin Pradier 2014 for further detail. 
9 This is one sixth of the yearly income, see Estat au vray des revenus et dépenses (AN K1024), which 
means “truthful statement of income and expenses”. 
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1.3. Life annuities 
In continuation of the medieval practice surveyed by Munro (2003), issuance of life 
annuities during the modern era seems to be connected with the urgent need for 
money (Hebrard (2005), Béguin-Pradier (2014)): the borrower does concede an 
interest premium in order to “squeeze the money out10” from the speculators. 
Usually, life annuities are offered at one half of the price for the perpetuities, stated 
in years’ purchase: for instance, when the taux du roy (maximum legal rate) was 20 
years purchase (100:20=5%) for perpetuities since 1665, this would entail a 10% 
nominal interest rate on life annuities (which was the case from 1702 on with the 
French Rentes sur l’Hôtel de Ville). Of course, the contingent yield to maturity has to 
be computed taking into account the age of the annuitant and the remaining 
mortality table. 
In 1671, de Witt wanted to inquire into the practice of half-pricing the life annuities. 
To do so, he computed the present value of expected future payments (given 
assumptions on mortality as experience did not provide a table before Halley in 
1693). The result, for a 4% perpetuity rate (25 years’ purchase) was that the life 
annuities rate should be priced at 16 years’ purchase (6.25% nominal rate), instead 
of the usual halving at 12.5 years purchase (or 8%). De Witt (1671) thus demonstrated 
that the traditional half-pricing was too generous for the buyer. 
But de Witt goes beyond the pricing issue. The reason why he did not give a full 
price table for the life annuities is simply that he was fully aware of the adverse 
selection caused by a flat rate: 
“the said life annuities are oftenest purchased and sunk upon the lives 
of young and healthy children of 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 years, or 
thereabouts. During that time, and for some years ensuing, these 
young lives, having become more robust, are less subject to mortality 
than about 50 years afterwards, and than for some years anterior to 
these 50 years; and so much the more, as during the first aforesaid 
years they either are not, or are but little, exposed to external 
accidents and extraordinary causes of death, such as those from war, 
dangerous voyages, debauch, or excess of drink, of the sex, and other 
dangers” (de Witt 1671 p. 15) 
De Witt here explains how buyers place life annuities on heads with the longest life 
expectation, hence the smallest risk of death. It is significant that the author does 
not cite illness as a cause of mortality, while mentioning ‘debauch’, which did not 
appear to kill as many people as smallpox (for instance) during that time. It is then 
obvious that, by choosing children of 10, not 2, investors are seeking to escape the 
“childhood diseases” which were more or less synonymous with smallpox (measles 
                                            
10 “Faire rentrer l’argent”, as wrote an employee of the Contrôle Général in 1688 or 1689 (during the 
war of the League of Augsburg, hence), see AN, G7, 1593, mémoires, 4 p. 
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etc. were not clearly distinguished until the nineteenth century and the 
generalization of vaccination).  By choosing the youngest heads who cleared 
diseases, investors seemed well aware of their advantage. Hup (2011) has shown that, 
between 1662 and 1713 in the Low Countries, only 20% of the life annuities were 
bought by people who thus “insured their lives” (against the possibility of not being 
able to earn themselves a living); the remaining 80% were sunk on the heads of 
young children to maximize the duration of annuity and thus, the expected return. 
From the Middle Ages on, there have been attempts at controlling adverse 
selection, but our knowledge so far is limited. Van Schaïk (2003) recalls that some 
cities set up age limit: 40 years (Augsburg 1457), 60 years (Nurnberg). Gilomen 
alludes to prices negatively correlated with age of the annuitants: from 5 to 7 years 
purchase in Southern Germany in 1373 (Gilomen 1984 p. 129), from 10 to 14 years 
purchase in Switzerland during the fourteenth century (Gilomen 2003 p. 136). Jack 
(1912) gives earlier examples, 4 to 10 years purchase in Breslau between 1342 and 
1379, among others, but this instances, although they have been copied by Murphy 
(1939) and then Poterba (2005), come from Stobbe (1865) and have never been 
checked since then. To sum it up, we know that people knew, but this is not 
enough to believe that they did well to counter adverse selection (Pradier 2011). 
More precisely, before 1672 we had no mention of annuities sold at price varying 
with age. Hôtel-Dieu had a clear age-price table before that date, and before de 
Witt. 
1.4. The data 
While Depauw (1999) p. 285 states that “price does not depend on the age of the 
lender”, Fosseyeux (1912) p. 189 gives an age-price table found at the Bibliothèque 
Nationale11: unfortunately, this is only a one-page manuscript inserted in a volume of 
papers brought together much later; we have thus no hint where this paper comes 
from nor when it was effectively implemented. The only way to know what 
happened at the Hôtel-Dieu is to find direct evidence. The primary sources were 
neglected so far, as they are trick to use: on the one hand, the Hôtel-Dieu’s own 
notary recorded every sale of annuity and kept a copy of the contract (AN MC 
XXXIII), on the other hand, the board of the hospital examined every request for 
life annuities in the original record of proceedings (Archives AP-HP cote 1438). When 
the board authorized a transaction, one of the notary’s clerks immediately drafted 
the contract so that the “donator” could sign it. In fact, both sources are necessary 
as no sale contracts mention the age of the annuitant before 1679 (and some still do 
not after), but the matching process is awkward: in 1667 for instance, out of 55 
entries, only 3 ages-price associations were made. Sometimes, the proceedings of 
the board state an age-price pair, but never make it clear whether the transaction 
was eventually made. Even such pricing, which did not lead to a transaction, still 
reveal the supply price of annuities. Figure 1 summarises the total number of 
transactions for the 1650-1690 period (red line) together with a count of instances of 
                                            
11 Fosseyeux quotes “MSS Fr 11364 fol. 77”; the contemporary reference is MF 34302 fol. 477. 
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valuation (i. e. including those which were not followed by the issuance of a 
security) for some years.  
 
From the 3,023 annuities sold by the Hôtel Dieu according to the insinuations du 
Châtelet, we collected more than 1,300 observations, from which 581 valid (age, 
price) pairs (represented by the bars on figure 1) were successfully double-checked. 
Observations were not selected on a purely random basis, as some files are 
damaged beyond repair, and some years appear more interesting: we selected 
especially 1665-1668 to determine the beginning of the implementation of a price 
table, then 1675 to 1677 because of the Franco-Dutch war, and 1687 as the last 
complete year without financial trouble. Years 1671 and 1684 were chosen randomly 
and added for comparison purpose, as well as the first half of 1674, and the second 
half of 1682. The resulting (age, price) pairs are plotted on figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 — (age, price12) pairs 
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It must be noted that some joint life annuities were sold during the 1660’s but we 
neglected a thorough study since they were discontinued after a few dozen were 
sold. Now that we have the data, let us analyse them. 
                                            
12  Price in years’ purchase 
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2. The pricing of Hôtel-Dieu’s annuities 
Our data points to an age-price table, which does not seem exact. Spread can be 
explained as charitable biases (2.1.) as the data seem to converge toward a definite 
table (2.2.), very close to Deparcieux’ results, computed almost a century later from 
data of the 1680’s (2.3.) 
 
2.1.  Age-price table and charitable biases 
The 581 (age, price) pairs provided by the database were plotted on figure 2. There 
seem to be “steps” in the figure, which constitute age-class eligible to a given price 
(in years purchase). The classes are somewhat blurred, though, because they 
partially overlap, although for each class there is a non-overlapping core. This core 
corresponds to the aforementioned table found by Fosseyeux at the Bibliothèque 
Nationale (MSS Fr 34302 fol. 477): 
 
Table 1 — life annuity prices per age class (in years purchase) 
From MF34302 
 
 Hôtel-Dieu Hôpital Général 
30 years 20 y.p. 16 y.p. 
35 years 17 y.p.  15 y.p. 
38 years 16 y.p. 15 y.p. 
40 years 15 y.p. 14 y.p. 
45 years 14 y.p. 13 y.p. 
48 years 13 y.p. 13 y.p. 
50 years 12 y.p. 12 y.p. 
55 years 11 y.p. 11 y.p. 
60 years 10 y.p. 10 y.p. 
65 years — 9 y.p. 
70 years — 8 y.p. 
 
It is worth noting that this document features two age-price tables: one for the 
Hôtel-Dieu, another one for the Hôpital Général, although we did not found any 
archival evidence of a large annuity trade corresponding to the latter institution. 
The two last “steps” in our database (age-classes 65-69 and 70+) nevertheless 
correspond to the table for the Hôpital Général, while for the 38-65 years 
annuitants, the data seems to follow the alleged Hôtel-Dieu table. 
 
The data does not fit the table very precisely, but spread can be rationalized as the 
result of charitable biases. Charitable bias I arise when young people considering 
taking holy orders or training as priests were offered a discount: as an income is 
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required to enter a convent or religious institution, the devout administrators thus 
provided an incentive by offering reduced price. Disabled persons are a 
neighbouring case: they can not marry nor take holy orders because of their 
disability, hence the Hôtel-Dieu is better off by offering them a discounted annuity 
rather than accommodating them forever. The many examples at hand13 show that 
the discount is variable; hence we cannot rationalize it fully. This charitable bias I 
nevertheless explains deviation to the left in figure 2 (see Appendix A for a 
representation). 
 
Charitable bias II is symmetrical, it happens when (true) donators offered more than 
the required amount. This charity bias is especially noticeable among older fellows, 
who give all they have to the Hôtel-Dieu in exchange for annuities14. When we look 
at figure 2, there are obvious right ‘distribution tails’ to 12, 11, 10 and 9 years 
purchase above 50 years, which embody this charitable bias II. One must recall that 
even at this price, annuities were still a bargain in comparison with perpetuities, 
sold at 20 years purchase from 1665 on (during peacetime). The “charitable deeds” 
was then very attractive. Some donators, though, paid the full price of a perpetuity: 
this gives some (4) outliers which we eliminated for better statistical result. 
Appendix A offers a regression of observed price against the price table found by 
Fosseyeux: the result are significant, but the fit is poor before 1680. 
Charitable biases might then explain some of the deviations from the table 
appearing in the MF34302, another reason is that the nature of the assets donated 
as well as the financial situation of the institution might influence the price15.  
Eventually, the selling price appear to be converging toward the theoretical table 
during the 1660’s. 
 
2.2. Time convergence… 
There are some preliminary price tables appearing in the record of proceedings for 
1665 and 1666, which do not match the (presumably) later MF 34302 table, as shown 
in table 2.  
                                            
13 Among dozens of examples: 20th of May 1667, Malachie Kelly, founder of the Irish college, funds a 
scholarship for François Burgois with a life annuity bought at only 15 years purchase while the 
young man is only 23 (this is a 25% discount). 14th January 1665, Marie Meusnier is awarded a 
discount (14 years purchase at age 28) because “she could not become religious while being 
disabled”.  
14 See e. g. Françoise Jamet, 93 years, giving 2,000 livres on the 27th of March 1676 at 12 years 
purchase (while she might have obtained 8 y. p. or even less), Marie de Gaillard, 77, on 16th of 
september 1689, giving 700 livres at 14 y. p. (instead of 8), etc. 
15 This is especially true for the early years, when the board accepted donations of either house 
furniture or financial assets, especially securitized loans (rentes sur particuliers), which were commonly 
circulated, see Hoffman et al. (2000). Payment in kind became less frequent in the late 1670, 
although some discounts were granted “because the institution need money and not otherwise”, 
especially during the Franco-Dutch War.  
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Table 2 — earlier life annuity prices per age class (in years purchase) 
From the records of the proceedings of the board (RPB) 
 
 RPB table 
14th Aug.1665 
RPB table 
22nd Jan. 1666 
HD 
MF 34302 
30 years – 16 y.p. 20 y.p. 
35 years – 16 y.p. 17 y.p.  
38 years – 16 y.p. 16 y.p. 
40 years – 16 y.p. 15 y.p. 
45 years – 16 y.p. 14 y.p. 
48 years – 16 y.p. 13 y.p. 
50 years 12 y.p. 15 y.p. 12 y.p. 
55 years 12 y.p. 14 y.p. 11 y.p. 
60 years 12 y.p. 12 y.p. 10 y.p. 
65 years 11 y.p. or 10 y.p. – 9 y.p. 
70 years – – 8 y.p. 
 
 
As soon as April 1666, one transaction was made at 18 years’ purchase, possibly 
indicating that the January table was already obsolete, but the MF 34302 does not 
feature an entry for 18 years’ purchase. Looking at the distance between tween 
observed prices and price tables makes it clear that none of the tables were 
implemented in 1665 and that the MF 34302 was close to the effective distribution 
as soon as 1668. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distribution confirms 
that the distribution of selling prices is the same as the distribution of the MF34302 
table from 1668 on: (table 3) 
 
Table 3 – mean sum of square distance to tables 
 
Year 
Mean sum of 
square distance, 
1666 table 
Number of 
observations 
Mean sum of 
square distance, 
MF34302 table 
Mean SSD 
MF34302 table, 
w/o outliers 
(number of obs) 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov equality 
of distribution test 
at 5% (stat, p-value) 
1665-7 5.62 71 4.63 4.34 (70) ✗ (0.2571, 0.020) 
1668 7 18 0.72 0.72 (18) ✓ (0.1111, 1.000) 
1671 4.73 15 3.27 0.37 (11) ✓ (0.2727, 0.479) 
1674-1679 136.0 149 5.5 1.97 (146) ✓ (0.0616, 0.927) 
1680 and later 138.17 325 0.43 0.43 (325) ✓ (0.0402, 0.946) 
 
While the MF34302 has a better fit than the 1666 table for every year or grouping of 
years, equality of distribution is only achieved if we leave aside charitable bias 
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outliers in 1671. After the Franco-Dutch war, the effective prices are very close to 
the table, but the war itself shows abnormal pricing behaviour in connection with 
financial distress (see note 15). 
 
Table 3bis – regression of actual annuities prices 
 
t table_ext charitybiasI charitybiasII Constant Adjusted R2 
0 0.8928334 -1.461788 1.245522 1.25122 0.9002 
1667 0.9498393 -1.321054 1.301382 0.5842409 0.9351 
1670 0.949779 -1.30097 1.317797 0.5825639 0.9353 
1673 0.9494559 -1.298788 1.234985 0.5848673 0.9419 
1679 1.002469 -1.050647 1.302994 -.0284371* 0.9713 
1679, 
no constant 
1.000089 -1.048058 1.299154 n/a n/a 
All variables significant at 1‰ except * – not significant 
 
regress years_purchase table_ext charitybiasI charitybiasII if year>t 
 
Eventually, it could be asserted that the effective pricing of Hôtel-Dieu followed the 
table since 1668, although there were significant deviations attributable to 
charitable bias or cyclical troubles, which were greatly reduced after 1680. How 
does this price table compare to contemporary prices? 
2.3. … to Deparcieux 
Before the Hôtel-Dieu sold annuities, only one age-price tables was known to exist: 
the ‘table of Ulpian’. It was not used to compute the value of life annuities but the 
value of usufruct on real estate (in connection with the Roman inheritance law, 
which granted freedom of destination for only ¼ of one’s wealth, the quarta 
falcidia). By comparison, early modern annuities prices were much flatter than the 
table of Ulpian: neither de Witt nor Hudde reached 20 years’ purchase. In order to 
compare these tables with the Hôtel-Dieu pricing scheme, we computed how much 
de Witt’s procedure would have given at later ages (as de Witt’s table only give one 
valuation for 6 years of age).  
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Table 4 — comparison of life annuity prices per age class (in years purchase) 
   
 Table of Ulpian 
ca. 220 AD 
De Witt 1671 
(generalization) 
Hudde 1672 HD 
MF 34302 
30 years 22 y.p. 12.2 y.p. 9 y.p. 20 y.p. 
35 years 20 y.p.  11.4 y.p.  9 y.p.  17 y.p.  
38 years 20 y.p. 10.9 y.p. 9 y.p. 16 y.p. 
40 years 19 y.p. 10.5 y.p. 8.5 y.p. 15 y.p. 
45 years 14 y.p. 9.6 y.p. 8 y.p. 14 y.p. 
48 years 11 y.p. 9.1 y.p. 8 y.p. 13 y.p. 
50 years 9 y.p. 8.7 y.p. 7.5 y.p. 12 y.p. 
55 years 7 y.p. 7.8 y.p. 6.75 y.p. 11 y.p. 
60 years 5 y.p. 6.8 y.p. 6 y.p. 10 y.p. 
65 years 5 y.p. 5.8 y.p. 5 y.p. 9 y.p. 
70 years 5 y.p. 4.8 y.p. 4 y.p. 8 y.p. 
 
The comparison between the Hôtel-Dieu and contemporary tables (Table 4) brings 
two main conclusions: 
- overall, the Hôtel-Dieu table commends considerably higher prices than the 
contemporary tables. A simple arithmetic mean of prices shows a 85% 
premium over the Hudde table and 54% over Johann de Witt; 
- while they might have controlled adverse selection, these high prices were 
not a deterrent: the Hôtel-Dieu really sold annuities at these high prices, 
especially for people above 40. 
 
Charging a higher price for annuities than other contemporary tables does not 
guarantee the sustainability of the life annuities selling business, though. In order 
to assess sustainability, we should compare those prices with the average life 
expectancy of annuitants. Alter and Riley (1986) surveyed all existing mortality 
tables of the time and find Deparcieux’ (1746) to give the longest life expectancy; 
longest even than contemporary reconstruction by the Cole-Demeny model for a 
life expectancy at birth of 40 years (p. 21-23). The reason for this is that Deparcieux 
statistics were computed from the annuitants of the first tontine, issued in 1689. As 
only people who feel in good health buy life annuities, Deparcieux’ data take into 
account the adverse selection problem, which other early demographers could not 
address. Moreover, the anthropological characteristics of both population (from the 
first tontine and the Hôtel-Dieu) should be as close as possible (same middle to 
upper class urban population of France in the 1660-1680). Figures 3 compares the 
pricing by Hôtel-Dieu with prices taken from Deparcieux (1746). 
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Figure 3 — comparison of prices for life annuities Hôtel-Dieu extended table 
with Deparcieux at various interest rates 
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The (so far) unexpected result is that the Hôtel-Dieu sold life annuities at a price, 
which is even higher than the figures computed by Deparcieux for 18 (5,56%) or 20 
(5%) years’ purchase. These rates were the taux du roy respectively until 1665 and 
after. Hoffman et al. (2000) have shown that these taux du roy were not only 
maximum interest rate on private loans: all assets had the same yield to maturity, 
without an idiosyncratic allowance for risk (with the exception of rentes in time of 
distress), hence their title “priceless markets”. On average, for years 15 to 90, the 
annuities sold by the Hôtel-Dieu were priced 34% above the pure premium price 
derived from Deparcieux’ table, they were thus sustainable. Nonetheless, the 
hospital des incurables (a twin hospital run by the same board) defaulted the 
quarterly payment of annuities in June 1689, and so did the Hôtel-Dieu three 
months later, in October. As we have shown the annuities to be correctly priced, 
the causes of this bankruptcy must be found somewhere else. 
 
3. Forensic evidence on bankruptcy 
In order to find the causes of bankruptcy, we analysed the accounting data, as 
provided by the Mémoires et instructions concernant le revenu temporel de l’Hôtel-Dieu 
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de Paris (AN K1024). This source gives some detail about the expenses from 1660 to 
1684. It appears then that the most likely cause is the undercapitalization of 
annuities (3.1.). Some other factors might have played a role, if not in the 
ineluctable bankruptcy, at least in the timing of the crisis (3.2.). 
3.1. A Ponzi scheme? 
The mémoires et instructions provide data grouped in irregular 2-3 years periods from 
1660 to 1684. We can infer a rough distribution of expenses, distinguishing debt 
service (on loans and annuities), (other) current expenses, retained earnings and 
investment. Figure 4 shows the evolution, with rising debt service and diminishing 
investment (detailed figures in appendix D).  
Figure 4 — expenses of the Hôtel-Dieu in livre tournois 
1661-1683 
 
  
Investment is the heart of the subsequent problem: in order to secure future 
payments, the amount collected when selling annuities should be invested into 
revenue-producing assets. The time offered few opportunities, though: real estate 
was generally considered locked in, and financial assets were hardly available in 
quantity, particularly in time where the Crown was not borrowing (which was the 
case before the Franco-Dutch War, hence until 1673). Nevertheless, the Chambre de 
Justice of 1661-1665 offered an opportunity: it was set up to judge the wrongdoings 
of Fouquet and his creatures, and caused many financiers to sell their real estate in 
order to invest their (fishy) money into assets protected from seizure… which was 
the case of life annuities (while perpetuities were considered real estate under 
custom of Paris, life annuities were considered “movable” property, hence not 
amenable to seizure). The Hôtel-Dieu thus experienced both an influx of money (the 
sale of annuities brought more than 600,000 livres in turnover for the year 1665) 
and opportunities to invest: in the week of 13th of May 1665 alone, the board bought 
10 houses in Paris according to the proceedings!  
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A more complete examination of the figures shows that less than 45% of the amount 
gathered by the sale of annuities between 1662 and 1684 was invested in revenue 
producing assets (Figure 5). While the ratio is 63% on average for 1662-1673, it 
suddenly drops with the Franco-Dutch war, down to 9% in 1676. The average for 
the next decade is 35%. The lack of available assets to invest cannot be alleged here, 
as the War provided excellent investment opportunities (in rentes sur l’Hôtel de 
Ville), as section 4 will show. Hence, it seems quite clear that the proceeds of the 
sale of annuities were not sufficiently invested into revenue-producing assets that 
could have secured future payments. A definite and rising fraction of the proceeds 
fuelled current expenses.  
Figure 5 — investment in proportion of annuities sales 
 
 
Although informative about the overall trend, this approach is not entirely 
conclusive since the data does not cover the whole period to 1690 on the one hand, 
while on the other hand it does not take into account the planned future expenses 
but the actual revenue, which might include some donations. A more correct 
approach would be to check every year that the additional capitalization reserves 
exceed the expected future expenses measured by , where ny is the 
number of contracts on year y, st the amount of annuities acquired by contract t and 
p(at) the price per livre of annuity depending on the age at of the contractor, as 
given by the Deparcieux table at the current legal interest rate. Since the dataset is 
not (and, as shown in section 1., it is likely never to be) exhaustive, we must provide 
an approximation of the capitalization reserves needed to guarantee payment of 
future annuities. We could, for instance, consider the minimum and maximum  
and : table 5 shows for the years with enough observations the average amount 
of annuities bought by donators and the mean price following Deparcieux table. It 
must be understood that the Deparcieux table provides the mathematical 
expectation of life, hence the price given by the table is the absolute minimum, 
with no provision for fluctuation of mortality or increase in longevity. From this 
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table, we can infer two couples of minimum and maximum , which will be 
compared to the actual flow of capitalization reserves. The result is plotted on 
figure 6.  
 
Table 5 – mean annuity and mean Deparcieux expected price for selected years 
 
Figure 6 has the same profile as figure 5 and confirms that the investment level was 
not entirely satisfactory: even the most favourable assumptions of minimum 
required capital are above the actual investment during the War of Holland. Taking 
into account the average of min and max would have made the Hôtel-Dieu losing 
money 10 years out of 24. Although we rely here on guesstimates, it is likely that the 
level of investment was not consistent with the expected payments. Hence the 
annuities sales, although it was done at a fair price, was undercapitalized. Recalling 
McHugh’s 2007 p. 79 words  – “the evidence for how the HD overcame its deficit 
are scanty…” – we might think we have documented the means to overcome the 
deficit: “appeal[ing] for more charity”, to quote McHugh. In fact, the board sold 
annuities in order to fund growing expenses, initiating a soft, protracted Ponzi 
scheme. The next question is then: why did bankruptcy happen in 1689? 
 
Figure 6 — actual vs. necessary capitalization 1660-1684 
 
Year 1665 1668 1671 1674 1675 1676 1677 1679 1682 1684 1687 1689 
 
 
428.4474  340 274.8182 226.6111 351.7205 388.9367 507.5726 256.3936 300.0381 323.2979 326.0215 316.2214 
 4.232813 4.737368 5.870667 5.456875 5.072927 6.405938 6.20375 6.022692 6.494222 5.988333 5.585565 6.389535 
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3.2. Efficient causes 
Right after the Franco-Dutch War, the Hôtel-Dieu suffered a permanent fall in its 
financial revenue.  While more than 75,000 livres were supposed to come every 
year from the rentes sur l’Hôtel de ville de Paris, this amount was reduced for various 
reasons. On the one hand, the perpetuities issued during the War at a very 
profitable 14 years’ purchase (see Béguin 2012), were converted to 20 years’ 
purchase; this is a 30% reduction on the 20,000 livres the Hôtel-Dieu bought during 
the War of Holland. On the other hand, the “old” perpetuities issued before 1640 
and still reported at their face value in the “truthful statement” of 1663 were 
supposed from 1665 to be “converted”; this was done in 1679 on a 1:6 basis, leading 
to a loss of almost 40,000 livres of yearly revenue. Both reductions amounted to 
almost 8% of the yearly expense. 
 
Then, it is generally agreed (Marczewski 1961) that the French economy experienced 
a downturn in 1686 with an en ensuing liquidity squeeze. The number of annuities 
sold in 1687 was lower than 1686 (-2%) and much lower in 1688 (-28%). Although we 
do not have any accounting information for these years (as the mémoires et 
instructions were interrupted since 1684), there is no reason to think that the 
expenses could have been contained, as the debt burden kept rising at accelerated 
pace, and the Nine years war would have surely brought in many indigent seeking 
relief and shelter (as the winter of 1662 did before). With diminishing income and 
rising expenses, the fragile Hôtel-Dieu could not withstand more than a year of war. 
A former near-bankruptcy episode has been premonitory: the turnover of annuities 
sales were down by 21% in 1676 over 1675, with a stable year 1677. On the 30th of 
June 1677, the proceedings of the board feature a statement that “Sir Lecomte knows 
that the Hôtel-Dieu needs money, and the Incurables is ready to give 15.000…” What 
happened? Thank to the help provided by its twin brother Incurables, the Hôtel-
Dieu made it through, but the king was made aware of the problem, and inclined to 
shutting down the annuities window once the war was over (proceedings, 28th april 
1679). It seems that Colbert or other very high protector obtained some delay, so 
that the annuities sales continued. In 1690, however, the Crown closed the annuity 
window without much hesitation. Taxes (on wine and public shows) were created to 
fund the Hôtel-Dieu and guarantee the payment of annuities, but the sale of life 
contingent contracts was over, together with the associated Ponzi scheme… 
 
4. Macroeconomic implications 
At the very moment when the Hôtel-Dieu experienced Ponszi-induced bankruptcy, 
the French monarchy began issuing life-contingent annuities to fund the Nine 
Years’ War: in 1689 a first batch of tontines (Gallais-Hamonno and Berton 2008), 
before regular life annuities were introduced in 1693. The synchronicity with the 
failure of the Hôtel-Dieu raises questions: did the Crown borrow at a more 
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sustainable price? (4.1.) In which case, the more attractive competition might have 
been a competitive threat. Or is it that the King borrowed at more favourable 
conditions for the borrower, in which case the failure of the Hôtel-Dieu would have 
been a clear sign of unsustainability of the state debt? Eventually, we shall ask 
whether there was any competition between various financial assets (4. 2.).  
4.1. Did the Crown borrow at a more sustainable price? 
As the edict of January 1690 forbade for hospitals to issue life annuities, because 
this was not sustainable, one can expect the life-contingent annuities issued by the 
Hôtel de Ville from 1689 on to be offered at higher prices. Looking at the price table 
of the rentes, they appear to be priced lower than their Hôtel-Dieu counterpart, as 
the figure 7 shows: 
 
Figure 7 – pricing tables of French life-contingent contracts 1689-1696 
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After 1693, it is worth noting that the tontine of 1696 was even more expensive than 
the first one in 1689. Starting in 1702, life annuities were offered at a flat 10 years’ 
purchase rate, hence close to 8% yield to maturity when invested on the head of 6-
year child. The rising servicing cost of life-contingent annuities seem to confirm 
Katia Béguin (2012) proof that the borrowing rate has been rising along Louis XIV’s 
reign, as a consequence of protracted wars against ever more numerous and 
powerful enemies.  
 
While years’ purchase are enough to understand that the Crown was borrowing at 
unsustainable rates during the Nine years’ war, this information does not 
immediately provide the borrower with an estimated cost of credit, nor the lender 
with his expected yield. Gallais-Hamonno and Berton computed the expected yield 
according to age, and we did the same for the Hôtel-Dieu (assuming the same 
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mortality as for the annuitants of the Tontine), next graphics sums up the 
corresponding information (figure 8). The yield of all four instruments is very close 
for younger lenders, it rises steadily with age for the Tontine: this was probably 
done to incentivize older prospects, and disarm the aforementioned tendency of 
speculators to buy annuities on the head of children already noticed by de Witt. 
The result is a very high expected return on the tontine for elderly: more than 13% 
at 75 years. But, as the appendix E shows, the age-structure of the annuitants is less 
concentrated than for the Hôtel-Dieu, which offered lower yields to maturity at 
older ages: overall, it does not seem that the yield to maturity was correctly guessed by the 
contemporaries. 
Figure 8 – expected yield to maturity on contingent assets 
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Next, the cost of credit, which is significant for the borrower, is computed relatively 
to the age-structure of the lenders. We do have this structure for both the Tontine 
and the Hôtel-Dieu (see appendix E), but not for the life annuity of 1693 (which 
indeed sold very poorly). The next table summarizes the mean expected returns and 
costs for the age structure of the Tontine (and in parenthesis for the age-structure of 
the Hôtel-Dieu): 
Table 6 — comparison of prices of life-contingent securities 
 Hôtel-Dieu Tontine 1689 Life annuity 1693 
Average years’ 
purchase 
14.4  
(11.52) 
12.06  
(10.03) 
10.4 
(8.55) 
Average nominal yield 6.94% 
(8.68%) 
8.29% 
(9.97%) 
9.62% 
(11.70%) 
Average expected YTM 5.13% 
(5.03%) 
8.62% 
(10.02%) 
6,74% 
(6.43%) 
Average borrowing 
cost per 1£ 
0.52 
(0.41) 
3.12 
(2.90) 
1.33 
(0.96) 
Present value @5% of 0.44 2.59 1.19 
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borrowing cost per 1£ (0.35) (2.48) (0.88) 
 
The nominal yield is simply the inverse of the years’ purchase figure. While the 
average yield is higher for the 1693 life annuity than for the 1689 Tontine, the 
ranking of expected yield to maturity (computed using Deparcieux’ mortality table) 
is inverted. The reason here is simply that the Tontine features reversionary 
payments: in each class, when one annuitant dies, his future income will be shared 
among the survivors until the last member of the class dies. The borrower thus pays 
far longer than with a usual life annuity. Now, the average borrowing cost, which is 
the flat sum of expected future payments above the amount paid by the annuitant, 
is far higher with the Tontine. If these sums are discounted at 5%, then the spread is 
somewhat reduced, but the Tontine remains by far the more expensive way to 
borrow… Before the French monarchy resorted to flat-rate life annuities at 10% in 
1702. 
 
These returns were promised, and Katia Béguin (2012) has shown that these French 
pseudo-sovereign securities were all but riskless: very often, the arrears were not 
paid to owners of the common, especially during the Fronde, they were reduced 
after the Chambre de Justice of 1661, and again after 1710. It shall then be asked how 
much the public was sensitive to these high interest rates: we are led to test for 
crowding out between the Hôtel-Dieu annuities and the rentes sur l’Hôtel de ville.  
 
4.2. Competition between financial assets? – new data sets 
While it is beyond our scope to give a complete account of Béguin (2012), it shall be 
recalled that her book made at least two breakthroughs, since it contains new 
extensive new time series on interest rates and debt issuances.  
 
On interest rates, the true figures were usually concealed for two different reasons: 
the enemy could notice that strong capital demand denotes the weakness of the 
kingdom, while inside the country, and raising the interest rate on new issuances 
would debase already issued securities. The ban on usury was supposed to benefit 
both the warmonger hawks, as the borrowing rates appeared steady hence the cost 
of war was apparently under control, and the devout doves, as steady rate protected 
the market value of assets. To achieve this apparent convergence, yield to maturity 
was dissimulated by various tricks, mainly issuance premiums (through blank forms 
in the 1650-1670 and then anticonversions) and life-contingent features (after 1689), 
see annex for an overview. It seems that the French monarchy has been 
experimenting to “squeeze out” every single drop of liquid assets. Graph 7 shows 
the whole time series for Louis XIV active reign: the picture looks more complex 
than the classic account of Homer and Sylla16 (2005) p.128.  
                                            
16 While the statement by these authors that “here is little evidence of an organized money market in 
France in the seventeenth century” has been adressed by Hoffman et al. 2000, the figures they 
quoted (5% interest rate for 1665-1688 and after 1697 while in between “some rentes […] between 1688 
and 1697 which again paid 81⁄3%”) is made more precise by Beguin (2012). 
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Figure 9 – nominal rates on rentes, yield to maturity and expected YTM 
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The rates reported here are maximum yields, either the expected yields of the best 
age class for contingent securities, or more generally the yield for lenders with 
connections (insiders), which enabled the effective payment of arrears (coupons), 
while most common annuitants (outsiders) might experience reduced payments (i. e. 
partial default). The spikes on the graph obviously correspond to war episodes: the 
Franco-Dutch war (1672-1678), then the Nine years’ war (1688-1697), eventually the 
War of the Spanish succession (1701-1714). The high return on contingent securities 
for 1689 is exactly the return on the aforementioned Tontine, but some later 
issuances (such as the rentes de rachat de capitation in 1709) offered an even higher 
yield. These new data make it possible to test for crowding out effect, but a 
thorough inquiry should also take into account the volumes of debt issued. 
 
There are then many obstacles to the measurement of either the amount of debt 
outstanding or the issuances, as the State relied on various instruments and the 
remaining accounting documents are scarce. Among instruments, the rentes sur 
l’Hôtel de ville were close to perpetual bonds, but there also existed a floating debt 
made of bills; the state could also profit from selling offices, which were 
remunerated by wages (called gages), not coupon payment. Fortunately for our 
research, bills were mostly issued later in the reign, and, as the offices, they are not 
perfect substitutes for rentes (since they are not perpetual; in the case of offices, the 
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wages were conditional on some work, which could not be done, for instance, by 
women or children, hence they could not provide them with an income). The rentes 
sur l’Hôtel de ville then seem the main debt instrument to be compared with the 
annuities sold by the Hôtel-Dieu. The amount of rentes issued had been counted by 
Moulin (1998), who noted every issuance authorized by an edict of the King; but 
Béguin (2012) has shown that some edicts were not followed by an actual issuance, 
and some issuances were used to consolidate previously issued debt at better 
conditions, especially when wars ended. Hence the list in Béguin (2012) clearly 
distinguishes between new debt issuance, consolidation and debt reduction by 
debasement of previously issued securities – which happens during the period 
under review since Colbert decided in 1665 to officially reduce the arrears served on 
rentes (which were already reduced since the Fronde in the 1640’s), but the face 
value of rentes was reduced only17 after the end of the war in 1680 through 
conversion to new rentes. However complex the situation is, Béguin (2012) provides 
us with sound data on gross debt issuance between 1660 and 1690, as well as on net 
new issuances, which were not designed to absorb previous instruments. Figure 8 
plots the resulting data: 
 
Figure 10 – amount outstanding and issuances of rentes sur l’Hôtel de Ville 
  
 
 
While the amount outstanding rises with new issuances at the beginning of the 
Franco-Dutch war, a progressive default starting in 1680 then reduces the amount 
outstanding despite continuing issuance of new securities. 
These datasets provided by Béguin (2012) allow us to test whether the perpetuities 
sold by the Hôtel de Ville competed with the annuities sold by the Hôtel Dieu. 
                                            
17 It might seem desperate to command that the market value of assets stay at a given level when the 
income of the same asset is cut; we recall here that anti-usury legislation prohibited to buy assets 
below par. See Turgot 1770 for a discussion of the actuality of the law. 
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4.3. Competition between financial assets? – testing a simple model 
For the Hôtel-Dieu, we do not have the amount of perpetuities issued every year, 
and it is likely that we will never have such data since some documents were 
damaged by a flood (the whole year 1679 for instance, is inaccessible). Nevertheless, 
we have the yearly count of the annuity contract subscribed, which appeared in 
figure 1. This is the variable we try to explain. The demand for such contracts may 
depend on a constant, a trend, the wealth created during the relevant period, and 
there might be some crowding out due to the issuance of perpetuities, especially if 
the amount issued is large or the interest rate is high. Hence our basic model would 
be: 
(0) contracts_countt = β1 + β2t + β3ln(rateRHVPt) + β4ln(GPPt) +  β5ln(debt issuance) + εt 
 
Where GPP denotes the gross physical product, as computed by Marczewski (1961). 
We expect the coefficient for interest rate and debt issuance to be negative, while 
GPP should be positive. We tried various specifications for the interest rate 
(nominal, ytm and expected ytm) and for the debt issuance (gross and gross 
issuance + debt redemption since the net issuance is sometimes negative).  An 
appendix gives the detail of the regression, but the next table gives the 
quintessential results: 
Table 7 – regression results 
Model (3.3.) (3.3. bis) (5.1.) (5.2.) (5.3.) 
Rate type contingent contingent nominal YTM contingent 
Number of 
observations 
30 30 30 30 30 
F-Stat 43.41 62.15 25.06 24.85 26.64 
R2 0.8336 0.8215 0.8393 0.8381 0.8473 
Adjusted R2  0.8144 0.8083 0.8058 0.8044 0.8155 
β1 / const. -32124** -18221** -65925** -63198** -41849 
β2 / trend -3.34 – -10.38** -9.77** -5.01* 
β3 / rate -7.33** -9,24** -11.65 -10.36 -6.11* 
β4 / GPP 1529** 869,5** 3135** 3005** 1991** 
β5 / issuance. – – -0.944 -0.868 -0.76 
β6 / redempt – – -0.768 -0.712 -0.26 
 
* — significant at 5% — ** — significant at 1% 
 
Adding explicative variables do not necessarily provide better result, since issuance 
figures are hardly significant, whether we consider gross or net data. The best 
estimate is eventually given by a very simple model (3.3. bis) with only three 
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variables: the constant, a wealth effect (GPP) and an interest-rate effect. More 
generally, the regressions make it clear that the effect of wealth on annuity 
subscription is strong: a 1% growth of the annual product would likely bring 15 
more contracts. Even if the issuance of debt does not have any significant crowding 
out effect, the maximum interest rate on newly issued rentes sur l’hôtel de ville has a 
definite impact: model 3.3. bis shows that the impact of a one-point increase of the 
interest rate on the rentes sur l’hôtel de ville would bring 9 less contracts to the Hôtel-
Dieu, that is around 9% of an average year.  
The crowding out effect is then effective, and relies especially on the maximum 
yield achieved on contingent annuities. This is consistent with the content of the 
proceedings of the board, which show many examples of young people alleging they 
“could get a better return” from some other borrower: for instance, on the 8th of 
February 1679, a 33 years old asks for “10 or 12 years’ purchase” as 14 years’ 
purchase perpetuities are available from the Hôtel de Ville, which is less expensive 
than the price in the regular Hôtel-Dieu table (18 years’ purchase). As a result, young 
people were quite rare in the age-structure of the annuitants, which are more 
concentrated in later ages (see appendix E), since the price of life annuities was 
more attractive for them than what they could have obtained from the Hôtel de Ville. 
In this respect, crowding out might have been a somewhat bilateral effect among 
borrowing institutions: in peace time, low years’ purchase attracted elder people to 
the Hôtel-Dieu, but during wars, rising interest rates progressively deterred 
everyone to invest with this institution, starting with the younger. This bilateral 
crowding out effect is likely to have provided the Crown with one more reason (the 
main one being the foreseeable consequence of the Ponzi scheme) to terminate the 
supply of life annuities by the Hôtel-Dieu. 
 
* 
 
Conclusion 
The Hôtel-Dieu was not just a hospital in early modern Paris, it was the showcase of 
the rising elite since the 1630’s: devout, urban, well into the king’s businesses. To 
keep on funding the modernization of the old hospital and developing 
medicalization in face growing social pressure, the administrators of the Hôtel-Dieu 
decided in 1662 to emphasize the sale of life annuities. We have shown that, from 
1668 on, the annuities sold by the Hôtel-Dieu were priced, on average (for years 15 to 
90), 34% above the pure premium price derived from Deparcieux’ table: they were 
thus sustainable if only they had been rightly used to buy revenue producing assets. 
Unfortunately, buying an annuity from the institution was framed as a good deed: 
the buyer was called a donator, contributing to the hospital expenses. The 
corresponding debt had not then to be funded and the administrators relied on a 
growing number of annuitants to pay for the earlier ones. Overall, the operation 
was soft Ponzi scheme: a very poor demonstration of expert financial management, 
eventually. 
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The story of Hôtel-Dieu’s bankruptcy has wider consequences as it provides us with 
a benchmark of the state borrowing capacity. Until the beginning of the Nine Years’ 
War, the French sovereign experienced high but sustainable borrowing rates. By 
the time the hospital went bankrupt, the rentes sur l’Hôtel de Ville de Paris were 
offered in life-contigent flavour much cheaper – for the buyer – than the annuities 
sold by the Hôtel-Dieu… and deliberately unsustainable for the borrower, as the war 
was not a profitable investment (the overall return computed by François Velde 
2008 was 0.7%). A crowding out effect between contingent securities seem to have 
existed, relying mainly on the rough comparison of price, stated in years’ purchase. 
Even if the buyers did not correctly guess the yield to maturity, the Crown’s 
financiers knew the scheme was unsustainable. The monarchy only succeeded in 
hiding the true borrowing rate, which was supposedly strategic information not to 
be disclosed in time of war. 
 
This inquiry into French finance of the Grand Siècle can be interpreted as a 
confirmation of what we know: neither actuarial science nor holistic thinking 
existed by that time, and the French king was trying to abuse his subjects with 
delusional borrowing schemes followed by financial repression; at the same time, 
the Dutch Republic enjoyed de Witt’s enlightened view on annuities and Britain 
was on the verge of a financial revolution. The twin failure of the Hôtel-Dieu and of 
the French Exchequer demonstrates the state of financial illiteracy of the French... 
Or, of the time: the present reader might think that Graunt (or Petty, following Le 
Bras 2000), Huygens and Halley had a clear understanding of the valuation of lives: 
it shall be recalled that de Witt’s study was met with a hanging rope; and a century 
later in the Duchy of Calenberg, whose sovereign was the King of England himself, 
the widow fund he sponsored gone bankrupt on the same kind of Ponzi scheme 
(Rosenhaft 2006) as the Hôtel-Dieu. This might deserve another study. 
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Annex — nominal rate manipulation techniques 
 
1. Blank forms 
This is a pre-filled form leaving only the names of the beneficiary and the 
intermediary. Such forms enabled syndicated issuance (by specialists) in the 1650s, an 
alternative to the previous solution of forced loans. The specialists bought bonds on 
wholesale, then sold them through the blank form, which could then be registered 
by a notary. The blank form opened many opportunities for fraud: successive sales 
can be performed before the form is brought to the notary, meanwhile the annuity 
is more or less a bearer share, which can freely circulate. The true cost of 
borrowing, as well as the margin of the intermediaries are concealed, in 
contradiction with the anti-usury laws. Katia Beguin undertook a major 
investigation to clarify the use of this instrument. 
 
2. Issuance premia 
Offering free coupons has long been a marketing trick when the annuities were not 
sought after, but the issuance premia climbed during the Franco-Dutch War: the 
first modest issuances in 1673-4, were not entirely subscribed although the interest 
rate was raised to 5.5% (18 years’ purchase) and 6.25% (16 years’ purchase). In 
December 1674, the price of annuities was lowered to 14 years’ purchase (7.14%), 
while the contracts still mentioned 16 years’ purchase, which were to be refunded 
to the lender after the war. The premium could also take the form of a partial 
payment in (debased) treasury bills, which reduced the actually paid capital. This 
solution was used repeatedly during the War of Spanish Succession, when the 
billets de monnoye have been multiplied, suffering heavy discount from their face 
value, and were accepted into increasing proportions with a fraction of species for 
annuity purchases. It was an incentive for paper-holders to get rid of it, both during 
the war and in the aftermath consolidation of debt. 
  
Issuance premia distort both the yield to maturity and amount outstanding to an 
extent that it is impossible to clarify in the current state of research. Concealment 
seems to have been organized (no record of the amounts actually received by the 
Exchequer, no accounting of the blank forms, official recognition of biased notarial 
acts), so that we can never get the truth. Only the crudest tricks can be reported 
without doubt. 
 
3. Anti-conversions 
The anti-conversions were implemented during the Nine Years’ War (1688-1697) 
and reactivated during the War of Spanish Succession. The principle of 
conversions performed throughout Western Europe to reduce the interest on 
annuities, is simply inverted: the annuitants could get a coupon rate rise in 
exchange for more money. A concrete example will help: the owner of a 100 
pounds-annuity at 20 years’ purchase paid 2,000 pounds for 100 pounds of yearly 
income. When the interest rate is raised at 18 years’ purchase, the former debt 
owner can buy as much new debt as they have old debt, the overall debt quantity 
being computed at the new price. Hence, the owner of 2,000 pounds worth of 
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capital for a 100 pounds per year annuity, shall now add 1,600 pounds to get 100 
pounds more per year, so that overall they invested 3,600 for a yearly income of 200 
(18 years’ purchase). 
 
In December of 1694, the Crown offered anti-conversion at 14 years’ purchase, that 
is, owner of 20 years’ purchase annuities could invest at 8 years’ purchase, so that 
20 + 8 = 28 / 2 = 14 years’ purchase (100 pounds of annuity bought for 2,000 plus 100 
pounds bought for 800 = 200 pounds of annuity bought for 2,800). 
 
Anti-conversions are then responsible for a spike in Figure 7 ; it is dubious, 
though, that all instances have been found so far. 
 
4. Contingent annuities 
The common practice in the late Middle Ages Germany, was to offer life annuities 
at half the years’ purchase of perpetual annuity (see e. g. Daston [1988], Gilomen 
[2003] Hébrard [2004] Munro [2003] Poitras [2000] van Schaik [2003]). Flat (i. e. non-
independent) price obviously entails a risk of adverse selection: de Witt [1671] is so 
far the first to mention how buyers of annuities selected children who had just 
proved their health by resisting childhood diseases. Such choice maximises the 
expected return. Hup [2011] has established a database of about a thousand 
contracts to test whether adverse selection happened in real life: he showed that 
buyers for their own account were on average twenty years older than the heads 
who commanded someone else’s pension. This means that there was in that time 
two very different approaches to annuity buying: one uses the instrument to 
guarantee an income for life, the other targets an abnormally high yield and bets on 
longevity of a head. In the sample of Hup, the first behavior represents only 20% of 
the subscribed volume. 
Can we extend the reasoning Hup to France? We know pretty well the age 
structure of the first tontine (through Deparcieux), and of the Hotel-Dieu (from our 
database): appendix E draws some conclusions from the comparison. In the current 
state of research, we have no idea of the population of annuitants from flate-rate 
annuities, which Hup studied, and which were issued in France after 1702.  
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Appendix A 
Plotting the Charitable biases 
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Appendix B 
Fitting the data with the MF34302 Table 
Regressing annuity price (in years purchase) on the HD table of MF34302 
‘extended’ with HG value for 65+ years 
 
Number of 
obs 
581 
F( 1, 579) = 2282.05 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.7976 
Adj R-
squared 
= 0.7973 
Root MSE = .94923 
years_purc~e Coef. 
Std. Err.  
t 
P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
table_ext2 .7262623 
.0152031 
 47.77 
0.000 .6964024 .7561221 
_cons 3.216251 
.1861527  
17.28 
0.000 2.850634 3.581868 
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Appendix C  
Illustrating time convergence 
Regressing for years 1680+ 
Number of obs 328 
F( 1, 326) = 2991.34 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.9017 
Adj R-squared = 0.9014 
Root MSE = .62846 
years_purchase Coef. 
Std. Err.  
t 
P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
table_ext2 .916061 
.0167491 
54.69 
0.000 .883111 .9490109 
_cons 1.055664 
.1954139  
5.40 
0.000 .6712324 1.440095 
 
Regressing for years 1674-1679 (Franco-Dutch War18) (without outliers) 
Number of 
obs 
146 
F( 1, 144) = 703.31 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.8301 
Adj R-
squared 
= 0.8289 
Root MSE = 1.0124 
years_purc~e Coef. 
Std. Err.  
t 
P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
table_ext2 .7384668 
.0278457 
26.52 
0.000 .6834277 .7935059 
_cons 3.011844 
.3448637 
8.73 
0.000 2.330195 3.693493 
 
                                            
18 Strictly speaking, the Franco-Dutch war lasted from 1672 to 1678. When we look at the interest 
rate served on rentes sur l’Hôtel de Ville de Paris (see section 4), the relevant period of high rates is 
1674-1679. 
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Regressing for years before 1674 
Number of 
obs 
107 
F( 1, 105) = 145.42 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.5807 
Adj R-
squared 
= 0.5767 
Root MSE = .98508 
years_purc~e Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
table_ext2 .4019301 
.0333302 
12.06 
0.000 .3358425 .4680177 
_cons 7.581628 .4564209 16.61 0.000 6.676629 8.486626 
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Appendix D 
“Truthful statement” of income and expenses 1663-1684 
The mémoires et instructions provide data grouped in irregular 2-3 years periods19. 
This raw data was recompiled into modern categories and smoothed with a 3-year 
mobile average.  
 retained 
earnings 
investment current 
expenses 
debt 
service 
1661 34710 354763 461709 73653 
1662 53887 416347 414058 77621 
1663 73064 477931 350549 97447 
1664 48709 476288 398123 117273 
1665 24355 474645 445697 137099 
1666 62536 326778 497519 156925 
1667 115380 180553 491633 176751 
1668 155067 138819 429825 196578 
1669 132219 243310 363769 216404 
1670 112034 292430 363073 236230 
1671 105004 237060 418298 256056 
1672 102671 178368 493083 275882 
1673 107368 175047 492817 295708 
1674 100619 147601 492946 315534 
1675 89173 123476 462402 346473 
1676 77728 99351 438519 370752 
1677 77728 99351 411635 397636 
1678 144982 140956 388706 439306 
1679 169713 257965 402965 479888 
1680 194444 374974 418153 519540 
1681 151129 434660 436691 558262 
1682 150338 418942 419761 596352 
1683 167666 307510 447527 633653 
1684 185786 211797 452319 672767 
 
The graph provided in the text sums up these data. 
                                            
19 To be precise, these periods are: 1660-1661, 1662-1664, 1665-1666, 1667-1668, 1669-1670, 1671-1672, 
1673-1674, 1675-1678, 1679, 1680-1681, 1682-1683 and 1684 alone. 
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Appendix E 
Age-Structure of Hôtel-Dieu and Tontine annuitants 
 
The age-structure of annuitants is summed up in the following table:  
 
Class 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Age 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+ 70+ 
HD 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,37% 0,14% 0,75% 1,87% 9,36% 14,01% 17,02% 28,06% 16,56% 6,68% 5,17% 
Tontine 
1689 
1,74% 2,53% 2,63% 2,60% 2,31% 3,35% 7,44% 7,58% 16,83% 12,81% 15,88% 8,35% 11,32% 4,64% 0,00% 
 
Which can be supplemented by a plot: 
 
 
 
It is then instantly visible that the tontine annuitants are less concentrated in the 50 
to 64 years range, and more equally spread among the possible ages.  
 
Gallais-Hamonno and Berton 2008 p. 57 noticed that the ages distribution is in no 
way determined by the yields, as if investors were not attracted by returns. The next 
figure provides an insight supplemented by a table: 
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While it might seem irrational to look for lesser returns, investment in a life 
annuity is tricky: even when it is possible to invest on somebody else’s head, as is 
the case here, asymmetric information might be a deterrent for uncertainty-averse 
investors, hence a “personal bias” (in the same sense as home bias). Hence, the 
difference between the Hôtel-Dieu and the Tontine population is that the HD 
annuitants are mostly looking for a retirement pension-like income, while some 
Tontine annuitants are looking for an investment opportunity, if not a gamble (on a 
child’s head).  
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Table – shares invested in different age-classes as a function of expected YTM 
 
HD Tontine 
YTM % 
invested 
YTM % 
invested 
3,58 0,75% 4,93 2,53% 
3,94 0,14% 4,94 1,74% 
4,07 6,68% 5,47 2,60% 
4,19 0,37% 5,49 2,63% 
4,38 0,00% 6,1 3,35% 
4,49 5,17% 6,17 2,31% 
4,54 0,00% 7 7,58% 
4,64 0,00% 7,04 7,44% 
4,66 0,00% 8,13 12,81% 
4,74 1,87% 8,2 16,83% 
5,02 16,56% 9,69 8,35% 
5,14 9,36% 9,81 15,88% 
5,47 14,01% 11,94 4,64% 
5,75 28,06% 11,94 0,00% 
5,93 17,02% 12,2 11,32% 
 
A picture gives a quick overall view. 
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Appendix F 
Test of crowding-out effect 
Annuity demand model 
 
(0) contracts_countt = β1 + β2t + β3ln(rateRHVPt) + β4ln(GPPt) +  β5ln(debt issuance) + εt 
 
Where GPP measures the gross physical product (computed by Marczewski [1961]), 
RHVP means rentes sur l’Hôtel de ville de Paris, the quasi-sovereign debt securities. 
As there are different means to measure the rates and issuance, we performed the 
following regression 
 
(1) contracts_countt = β1 + β2t + εt 
Simple model for control purpose. 
 
(2) contracts_countt = β1 + β2t + β3ln(rateRHVPt) + εt 
 
Where rateRHVP can be alternatively the apparent rate (2.1.), the maximum certain 
rate (2.2.) as computed by Béguin (2012) or the maximum contingent rate (2.3.). 
(3) contracts_countt = β1 + β2t + β3ln(rateRHVPt) + β4ln(GPPt) + εt 
 
Here again we review 3 submodels (3.1) with apparent rate, (3.2.) with max certain 
rate and (3.3.) with max contingent rate. 
(4) contracts_countt = β1 + β2t + β3ln(rateRHVPt) + β4ln(GPPt) +  β5ln(gross issuance) + εt 
 
The model is tested with gross debt issuance as recorded, for instance, by Moulin 
(1998). 3 submodels with the usual indices. 
 
(5) contracts_countt = β1 + β2t + β3ln(rateRHVPt) + β4ln(GPPt) +  β5ln(net issuance) + εt 
 
As the ‘net issuance’ series would feature negative figures, the model must be 
replaced with  
(5.b) contracts_countt =    β1 + β2t + β3ln(rateRHVPt) + β4ln(GPPt)  
+  β5ln(issuance) + β5ln(redemption) +εt 
 
Where redemption is the yearly volume of debt redemption, as computed by 
Béguin (2012). 3 submodels with the usual indices. 
 
The results appear in the following pages. 
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Model 1. 
 
Number of 
obs 
30 
F( 1, 28) = 39.94 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.5879 
Adj R-
squared 
= 0.5732 
Root MSE = 26.064 
contracts_ 
count 
Coef. 
Std. Err.  
t 
P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
t 3.474527 
.5497769 
6.32 
0.000 2.34836 4.600694 
_cons 45.61149 
9.760153  
4.67 
0.000 25.61873 65.60426 
 
Model 2. 1. 
 
Number of 
obs 
30 
F( 2, 27) = 19.74 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.5938 
Adj R-
squared 
= 0.5637 
Root MSE = 26.35 
contracts_ 
count 
Coef. 
Std. Err.  
t 
P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
t 3.523294 
.561216  
6.28 
0.000 2.371774 4.674814 
apparent_rate -4.692943 
7.471588  
-0.63 
0.535 -20.02337 10.63749 
_cons 70.96245 
41.54969  
1.71 
0.099 -14.29047 156.2154 
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Model 2.2. 
 
Number of 
obs 
30 
F( 2, 27) = 20.49 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.6028 
Adj R-
squared 
= 0.5734 
Root MSE = 26.057 
contracts_ 
count 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
t 3.597252 
.5629868 
6.39 
0.000 2.442098 4.752405 
certain_rate -6.834078 
6.786367 -
1.01 
0.323 -20.75855 7.090397 
_cons 82.24435 
37.66307 
2.18 
0.038 4.966114 159.5226 
 
 
 
Model 2.3. 
 
Number of obs 30 
F( 2, 27) = 45.32 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.7705 
Adj R-squared = 0.7535 
Root MSE = 19.808 
contract_c~t Coef. 
Std. Err.  
t 
P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
t 4.207589 
.4467578  
9.42 
0.000 3.290918 5.12426 
contingent_rate -11.38129 
2.45576  
-4.63 
0.000 -16.4201 -6.342491 
_cons 101.1559 
14.09459  
7.18 
0.000 72.23616 130.0756 
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Model 3.1. 
Number of obs 30 
F( 3, 26) = 36.26 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.8071 
Adj R-squared = 0.7848 
Root MSE = 18.505 
contract_count Coef. 
Std. Err.  
T 
P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
t -8.123755 
2.207754  
-3.68 
0.001 -12.66186 -3.585652 
apparent_rate -10.58199 
5.36076  
-1.97 
0.059 -21.60119 .4372079 
GPP 2456.659 
458.1913  
5.36 
0.000 1514.833 3398.485 
_cons -51634.76 
9643.676  
-5.35 
0.000 -71457.62 -31811.9 
 
 
Model 3.2. 
Number of obs 30 
F( 3, 26) = 37.08 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.8105 
Adj R-squared = 0.7887 
Root MSE = 18.339 
contract_c~t Coef. 
Std. Err. 
T 
P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
t -7.748053 
2.161556  
-3.58 
0.001 -12.19119 -3.304911 
certain_rate -10.14702 
4.816475  
-2.11 
0.045 -20.04742 -.2466091 
GPP 2392.988 
448.1968  
5.34 
0.000 1471.707 3314.27 
_cons -50296.63 
9435.79  
-5.33 
0.000 -69692.17 -30901.08 
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Model 3.3. 
 
Number of obs 30 
F( 3, 26) = 43.41 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.8336 
Adj R-squared = 0.8144 
Root MSE = 17.187 
contract_count Coef. 
Std. Err.  
t 
P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
t -3.341575 
2.434964  
-1.37 
0.182 -8.346714 1.663564 
contingent_rate -7.329132 
2.491079  
-2.94 
0.007 -12.44962 -2.208646 
GPP 1529.225 
486.9568 
3.14 
0.004 528.2707 2530.179 
_cons -32124.28 
10261.67  
-3.13 
0.004 -53217.46 -11031.11 
 
The interest rate is not significant at the 1% level in 3.1. and 3.2. In 3.3., t is not 
significant, we performed a regression without t as… 
 
Model 3.3. bis 
 
Number of obs 30 
F( 2, 27) = 62.15 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.8215 
Adj R-squared = 0.8083 
Root MSE = 17.466 
contract_count Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
contingent_rate -9.242151 
2.098022 -
4.41 
0.000 -13.54694 -4.937366 
GPP 869.482 
78.7817 
11.04 
0.000 707.8353 1031.129 
_cons -18221.83 
1661.795 -
10.97 
0.000 -21631.55 -14812.11 
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Model 4.1. 
Number of obs 30 
F( 4, 25) = 31.19 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.8331 
Adj R-squared = 0.8064 
Root MSE = 17.555 
contract_count Coef. 
Std. Err.  
t 
P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
t -8.624574 
2.109734  
-4.09 
0.000 -12.96965 -4.279495 
apparent_rate -8.400703 
5.204369  
-1.61 
0.119 -19.1193 2.317897 
GPP 2699.087 
451.7086 
5.98 
0.000 1768.776 3629.398 
issuance -1.084267 
.5497066  
-1.97 
0.060 -2.216409 .0478747 
_cons -56754.22 
9509.584  
-5.97 
0.000 -76339.58 -37168.87 
 
 
Model 4.2. 
Number of obs 30 
F( 4, 25) = 31.10 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.8327 
Adj R-squared = 0.8059 
Root MSE = 17.576 
contract_count Coef. 
Std. Err.  
t 
P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
t -8.271776 
2.091565  
-3.95 
0.001 -12.57944 -3.964118 
certain_rate -7.666971 
4.81341  
-1.59 
0.124 -17.58037 2.246434 
GPP 2627.17 
448.4453 
5.86 
0.000 1703.58 3550.761 
issuance -1.019688 
.5608067  
-1.82 
0.081 -2.174691 .1353152 
_cons -55243.81 
9443.711  
-5.85 
0.000 -74693.49 -35794.12 
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Model 4.3. 
 
Number of obs 30 
F( 4, 25) = 34.42 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.8463 
Adj R-squared = 0.8218 
Root MSE = 16.843 
contract_count Coef. 
Std. Err.  
t 
P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
t -4.616576 
2.545169  
-1.81 
0.082 -9.85845 .6252989 
Contingent_rate -5.8908 
2.637626  
-2.23 
0.035 -11.32309 -.4585079 
GPP 1882.4 
536.5408 
3.51 
0.002 777.3739 2987.427 
issuance -.8018605 
.5568457  
-1.44 
0.162 -1.948706 .3449846 
_cons -39570.78 
11307.83  
-3.50 
0.002 -62859.7 -16281.86 
 
4.1. and 4.2. are not satisfactory since there are still significativity issues. 
 
In 4.3. neither t nor gross issuance are significant, hence the model breaks down to 
3.3. bis. 
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Model 5.1. 
Number of obs 30 
F( 5, 24) = 25.06 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.8393 
Adj R-squared = 0.8058 
Root MSE = 17.581 
contract_count Coef. 
Std. Err.  
t 
P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
t -10.37982 
2.792759  
-3.72 
0.001 -16.14379 -4.615852 
apparent_rate -11.6502 
6.212736  
-1.88 
0.073 -24.47266 1.172257 
GPP 3135.293 
640.8027 
4.89 
0.000 1812.741 4457.844 
Issuance -.9440588 
.5695438  
-1.66 
0.110 -2.119539 .2314219 
Redemption -.7683351 
.7993828  
-0.96 
0.346 -2.41818 .8815098 
_cons -65925.28 
13481.53  
-4.89 
0.000 -93749.8 -38100.77 
 
Model 5.2. 
Number of obs 30 
F( 5, 24) = 24.85 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.8381 
Adj R-squared = 0.8044 
Root MSE = 17.644 
contract_count Coef. 
Std. Err.  
t 
P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
t -9.770912 
2.680612  
-3.65 
0.001 -15.30342 -4.238402 
certain_rate -10.35789 
5.682933  
-1.82 
0.081 -22.08689 1.371108 
GPP 3005.452 
616.029  
4.88 
0.000 1734.031 4276.873 
Issuance -.8684973 
.5875136  
-1.48 
0.152 -2.081066 .3440711 
redemption -.7120675 
.7915864  
-0.90 
0.377 -2.345822 .9216866 
_cons -63197.92 
12963.69  
-4.87 
0.000 -89953.65 -36442.18 
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Model 5.3. 
 
Number of obs 30 
F( 5, 24) = 26.64 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.8473 
Adj R-squared = 0.8155 
Root MSE = 17.136 
contract_count Coef. 
Std. Err.  
t 
P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
t -5.015004 
2.783145  
-1.80 
0.084 -10.75913 .7291249 
Contingent_rate -6.112645 
2.74296  
-2.23 
0.035 -11.77384 -.4514542 
GPP 1990.579 
612.1257  
3.25 
0.003 727.2136 3253.944 
issuance -.7612756 
.5759822  
-1.32 
0.199 -1.950044 .4274932 
redemption -.260949 
.6681452  
-0.39 
0.700 -1.639933 1.118035 
_cons -41848.67 
12898.48  
-3.24 
0.003 -68469.82 -15227.53 
 
 
Adding redemption information does not improve the performance of any model. 
Hence model 3.3. bis seems the best fit, but it is worth notice that elasticity of 
contract count to the interest rates is rather robust among regression specifications. 
 
Overall, a one-point increase in the rate served on the Rentes sur l’Hôtel de Ville 
de Paris results in around 10 less annuity contracts signed at the Hôtel-Dieu.  
 
Data mining (i. e. dropping one variable or another) to test the significance of 
issuance figures does not bring any positive result. 
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